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Mutual Trust and Co-operation under NEC 3&4: A 
Fresh Perspective 
 
Joseph Mante1 
Abstract  
Using insights from planning and employment law, this piece looks 
beyond the conventional connotation of good faith and critically 
examines the meaning, scope and consequence of the duty to act in 
a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation under Clause 10 of NEC3 
and NEC4. 
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Introduction  
The duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation is 
established by clause 10.1 of the NEC3 ECC form and sub-clause 10.2 
of the recently launched NEC4 Conditions.2 It requires all key players 
involved in a project – the Parties, Project Manager and the 
Supervisor - to act in a ‘particular way’ when carrying out their 
obligations under the contract.  Indeed, the impact of the duty 
transcends the main NEC Conditions3 to any linked contract. The 
Project Manager under both NEC3 and NEC4 ECC is mandated to 
reject subcontract documents ‘if they do not include a statement that 
the parties to the subcontract act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation’.4 Under NEC4 ECC, an assignment of benefits under a 
contract by the Client5 will fail if the party or parties receiving benefits 
under the assignment do not ‘intend to act in a spirit of mutual trust 
and co-operation’.6 The first edition of the NEC Conditions had no 
such duty. The duty was part of the recommendations of the Latham 
Report.7 At paragraph 5.20 of the Report, it was suggested as follows: 
A statement should be written into Core Clause 1 that the 
employer and the contractor affirm that they both intend to 
                                      
1 LLB, BL, LLM, PhD. Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. Thanks to Professor Ken Mackinnon, Head, Law 
School, RGU and Mr. David Christie, Senior Lecturer, Law School, RGU for their input.  
2 The NEC4 suite of Contracts was launched on 22 June 2017. The launch of NEC4 did not do away with NEC3. As is often the 
case with most construction forms, it will be sometime before the NEC4 Conditions will gain traction among users; many will 
continue to use NEC3 a while longer. 
3 NEC Conditions is used throughout this work to refer to both the NEC 3 and NEC4 Conditions of contract. 
4 See NEC3&4 ECC, cl. 26.3 
5 The employer under the NEC4 is called the Client. 
6 See NEC4, cl. 28 
7 See Guidance Notes for the NEC3 Engineering and Construction Contract, p.31; M. Latham, Constructing the Team, Final 
Report of the Government/Industry Review of Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in the UK Construction Industry 
(London, HMSO, 1994),p.39  
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establish a fair and reasonable agreement with each other to 
undertake the project in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation, and to trade fairly with each other and with their 
subcontractors and suppliers. Core Clause 16.3 should be 
strengthened to make it clear that “win-win“ solutions to 
problems will be devised in a spirit of partnership. Identical 
wording should be included in the appropriate Core Clauses in 
the subcontract document.8 
A closer reading of the Latham Report suggests that this 
recommendation was a direct response to the prevailing culture of 
adversarialism and a clarion call for trust, transparency, co-operation 
and partnership in construction contracts.  
The duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation made its 
way into the second edition of the NEC Conditions but without any 
further explanation of its meaning or scope. The NEC Conditions have 
since undergone two major reviews. In each case, the reviewers have 
thought it prudent not to define the scope of the duty. Growing 
judicial and academic activity points to a yearning for a better 
understanding of the concepts embodied in the duty to act in a spirit 
of mutual trust and co-operation under the NEC3 ECC and NEC4 ECC.9 
The discussions have tended to classify the duty as connoting good 
faith. Very little work has been done to investigate the legal and 
conceptual antecedents of ‘mutual trust’ and ‘co-operation’ as English 
law concepts at the heart of this duty. Using relevant case law, 
literature and the text of the NEC Conditions, this study takes up this 
challenge of critically examining similar concepts in other areas of law 
for insights into the meaning of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual 
trust and co-operation under the NEC Conditions. The study finds that 
valuable lessons could be learnt from judicial and academic 
exposition on related concepts from planning and employment law. 
On this basis, the study proffers a fresh viewpoint on the meaning 
and implications of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation which is not necessarily tied to the nebulous concept of 
good faith. 
 The paper is divided into four sections. The first part examines 
current understanding of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust 
and co-operation and good faith. The second section discusses the 
different components of the ‘mutual trust and co-operation’ obligation 
                                      
8 Ibid. p.39 (para 5.20). 
9 See D. Mosey, “Good Faith in English Construction Law‐ What does it mean and does it matter?”  (2015) ICLR 392; Jur B. Fuchs 
and S. Jackson, “Good Faith: An Anglo‐German Comparison” (2015) ICLR 404; D. Christie, “How can the use of ‘mutual trust and 
co‐operation’ in the NEC 3 suite of contracts help collaboration?”  (2017)  ICLR 34(2), 93‐112; B. Mason, “Good faith clauses in 
construction contracts: fine sentiments in search of substance” [2011] ICLR 5; D. Thomas QC, Keating on NEC3 (London, Sweet 
and Maxwell,2012) 11 
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from the perspective of other branches of law. The third part 
discusses breach of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation, judicial attitudes towards the duty and ensuing remedies. 
The final section pulls together the lessons from the study.  
Mutual trust and Co-operation     
Clause 10.1 of the NEC3 ECC provides that ‘the Employer, the 
Contractor, the Project Manager and the Supervisor shall act as 
stated in this contract and in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation’. The NEC4 emphasises the two-fold nature of the 
obligations under clause 10.1 of NEC3 by separating these obligations 
into distinct sub-clauses. Clause 10.1 of NEC4 ECC provides as 
follows: ‘The Parties,10 the Project Manager and the Supervisor shall 
act as stated in this contract’. This is followed by Clause 10.2 which 
states that, ‘the Parties, the Project Manager and the Supervisor act 
in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation’. The language of clause 
10.1 in both NEC3 and NEC4 suggest a connection between this 
clause and all other terms of the NEC Conditions; parties and the two 
key administrators of the forms - the Project Manager and the 
Supervisor - are to comply with all terms of the contract. As the only 
term in the NEC Conditions couched in mandatory terms, it 
encapsulates all other terms, unless the language states otherwise.11  
Added to the obligation to comply with terms of the contract is the 
duty to act ‘in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation’.12 The widely 
held view on this duty is that it connotes good faith.13 Why do many 
commentators see a link between this duty and good faith? A brief 
exploration of good faith will explain the connection. 
Good faith 
Much has been written about good faith,14 but there is still no 
consensus in sight on its precise meaning or confines. This stems 
from the nebulous nature of the concept. This vagueness is both its 
                                      
10 Referring to the Client (formerly the Employer) and the Contractor – see NEC4 Engineering and Construction Contract (NEC4 
ECC), cl. 11.2(13). Under the appropriate Conditions, this will include the Sub‐contractor. 
11 E.g. where actions are permitted but not mandatory. 
12 Also referred to in this work as clause 10 duty. 
13 See D. Mosey, “Good Faith in English Construction Law‐ What does it mean and does it matter?”  (2015) ICLR 392; Jur B. 
Fuchs and S. Jackson, “Good Faith: An Anglo‐German Comparison” (2015) ICLR 404; D. Christie, “How can the use of ‘mutual 
trust and co‐operation’ in the NEC 3 suite of contracts help collaboration?”  (2017)  ICLR 34(2), 93‐112; B. Mason, “Good faith 
clauses in construction contracts: fine sentiments in search of substance” [2011] ICLR 5; D. Thomas QC, Keating on NEC3 
(London, Sweet and Maxwell,2012) 11 
14 Oxford University Obligations Group, "Some Reflections on Good Faith in Contract Law" (February 2012), p.1.; J. Tarr, “A 
growing good faith in contracts”, (2015)J.B.L 410 
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strength15 and weakness.16 This piece does not pretend to review all 
the protean literature on the concept; it only aims to highlight the 
key aspects of the concept sufficient to anchor the discussion on the 
duty of mutual trust and co-operation under the NEC Conditions. 
Essentially good faith means different things to different people in 
different contexts. At its core, good faith is about honesty, 
transparency and fair dealing, the concepts the Latham Report 
alluded to.17 Justice Leggatt in Yam Seng Pte Limited v International 
Trade Corporation Limited18 and Cromwell J in the Canadian Supreme 
Court case of Bhasin v Hrynew19  agree that the core value of good 
faith is honesty. Beyond the different formulations of the honesty 
value, both courts also admitted that many more notions and duties 
come within the scope of the concept of good faith.  
In Yam Seng, these notions were said to include duty to disclose, 
duty to co-operate (which is an outgrowth of the idea of ‘fidelity to 
the parties’ bargain), duty not to arbitrarily exercise discretionary 
powers under contract and duty not to unreasonably withhold 
consent.20 In Astor Management AG & Anr v Atalaya Mining Plc & 
Others21, Justice Leggatt summed up what the duty of good faith 
entails as follows: 
A duty to act in good faith, where it exists, is a modest 
requirement.  It does no more than reflect the expectation that 
a contracting party will act honestly towards the other party 
and will not conduct itself in a way which is calculated to 
frustrate the purpose of the contract or which would be 
regarded as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and 
honest people.22  
In Bhasin, the Court acknowledged categories of good faith as 
including duty to cooperate, duty not to exercise discretionary powers 
under contract arbitrarily and duty not to evade contractual duties.23 
Terms such as fair dealing, transparency, decency, common ethical 
sense and community standards have been traditionally construed as 
                                      
15 See S. Saintier, “The elusive notion of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bete noire for the civil and the 
common law?” (2017) J.B.L. 441,453 which argues that the fluidity of good faith enhances its adaptability. 
16 A. Mugasha, “Good faith Obligations in Commercial Contracts” ‐ (1999) 27 Int'l Bus. Law. 355 at 356 which argues that this 
vagueness is the weakness of good faith as it challenges the ideals of legal certainty and predictability, the hallmarks of the 
English legal system. 
17 M. Latham, Constructing the Team, Final Report of the Government/Industry Review of Procurement and Contractual 
Arrangements in the UK Construction Industry (London, HMSO,1994), 39 at [5.20] 
18 Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited [2013] EWHC 111 (QB); [2013] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1321  
19 2014 SCC 71 at [65] 
20 Yam Seng [2013] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1321 at [139,145].)    
21 [2017] EWHC 425 (Comm) 
22 Ibid, para 98. See also Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB).  
23 See Bhasin 2014 SCC 71; [2014] 3 S.C.R. 495 at [47] agreeing with J.D. McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd edn (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2012), pp.840–856. 
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elements of good faith.24 Saintier25 observes that in French law, good 
faith finds expression in the ideas of loyalty, cooperation and 
coherence - it is a ‘comportmental’ (behavioural) norm.26 In a lecture 
delivered at Cambridge University in the early 1990s, the renowned 
Australian judge, Sir Anthony Mason, observed that the concept of 
good faith has three elements to it: an obligation to cooperate to 
achieve contractual objects; compliance with honest standards of 
conduct; and compliance with standards of contract which are 
reasonable having regard to the interests of the parties.27 In the 
context of construction law, Morsey28  has argued that this may 
require parties to deal with each other honestly in the disclosure of 
information, act fairly and reasonably in the exercise of discretion and 
or take account of interests of others. 
 
Given the difficulty, or even the near impracticality of any endeavour 
to identify all ideas/duties encapsulated by good faith as a concept, 
some authors, including McKendrick,29 have argued that the concept 
should be viewed as an organising framework for specific duties or 
notions. This suggestion accords with the decision in Bhasin which 
viewed good faith essentially as an organising principle.30 Good faith 
has been considered as an evolving spectrum of obligations; it is an 
avenue through which new rules find expression.31  
 
The influence of the concept of good faith on contract law extends to 
pre-contract negotiations,32 contract formation,33 performance34 and 
enforcement.35 Three different approaches have been used to 
incorporate good faith into contracts generally. Firstly, parties 
introduce good faith as an express clause into their contracts. 
                                      
24 A. Mugasha, “Good faith Obligations in Commercial Contracts” ‐ (1999) 27 Int'l Bus. Law. 355 at 356 
25 S. Saintier, “The elusive notion of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bete noire for the civil and the 
common law?” (2017) J.B.L. 441 
26 Ibid at 444 
27 A. Mason, “Contract and Its Relationship with Equitable Standards and the Doctrine of Good Faith” The Cambridge Lectures 
1993, 8 July 1993, at 5‐6. See also the decision in Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney South West Area Health 
Service [2010] NSWCA 268 at [90]. Per Hodgson JA 
28 D. Mosey, “Good Faith in English Construction Law‐ What does it mean and does it matter?”  (2015) ICLR 392 
29 McKendrick, "Good Faith in the Performance of a Contract in English Law" in Comparative Contract Law (2015), p.204. 
30 2014 SCC 71 at [65] 
31 S. Saintier, “The elusive notion of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bete noire for the civil and the 
common law?” (2017) J.B.L. 441 at 445 
32 Cable and Wireless Plc v IBM UK Ltd [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm); see R. Merkin, Arbitration Law (Informa Law Library, loose‐
leaf), Ch.6, para.6. 
33 Insurance law has long recognised the role of good faith in contract formation. See the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 17; 
Julie‐Anne Tarr, “A growing good faith in contracts”, (2015)J.B.L. 411 
34 S. Saintier, “The elusive notion of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bete noire for the civil and the 
common law?” (2017) J.B.L. 441 
35 see Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) s.17, as amended by s.14(3) of the Insurance Act,2015 – utmost good faith left in the law 
as an interpretive device – see Law Comm. Report (July 2014), Cm.8898, paras 30.22 to 30.23 and the Explanatory Notes on the 
Insurance Act ,2015, paras 113‐116 – not exactly clear what this mean but appears to be a response to the Yam Seng decision 
and also align with the decision in Bhasin – see Z. X. Tan, “Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐Yam Seng 
and Bhasin” (2016) J.B.L420, 438; See also C. Y. Ahmet, “Reasonable and good faith: new uses for legal standards” (2017) IBLJ 
549, 554: the Romano‐Germanic legal system see good faith as a contract interpretation tool –  Ahmet cites examples of the 
German, Swiss and Turkish systems. The German system sees good faith as a complementary interpretation tool – s.157 of 
BGB. 
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Secondly, the concept is finding its way into aspects of English 
contract law through statutory provisions.36 Finally, good faith may 
be implied into a contract by the courts.37 In Canada and Australia,38 
good faith has been recognised as a common law duty. In Bhasin, the 
Supreme Court of Canada observed that the duty to be honest ‘should 
not be thought of as an implied term, but a general doctrine of 
contract law that imposes as a contractual duty a minimum standard 
of honest contractual performance’.39  
 
An idea which runs through nearly all discussions on good faith 
surveyed is context. Good faith appears to take on different hues 
depending on the context (or jurisdiction) in which it is deployed. 
Most civil law and some common law jurisdictions have embraced the 
concept broadly as an overriding principle, but there is an ongoing 
disagreement on the place of good faith in English law.40 Traditionally, 
English law does not recognise a general duty of good faith 
performance in all contracts.41 Nearly thirty years after Bingham L.J. 
affirmed the position of English law on this matter in the case of 
Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd,42 the 
situation largely remains the same43 although incremental progress 
towards recognition of good faith in certain areas of contract have 
been made.44  For instance, where parties choose to expressly 
incorporate good faith into their contracts or the concept is implied 
by statute, the courts often enforce such clauses.45 Much of the 
controversy regarding the role of good faith in English law has arisen 
in instances where there have been attempts to imply the concept 
into contracts generally.46 In these instances, the English courts 
remain resolute in their opposition to good faith as an overriding 
concept.47 McKendrick48 provides three reasons for this opposition. 
                                      
36 See Consumer Rights Act, 2015, s.62 (4) and (6). The focus of this piece is on performance and enforcement. 
37 Yam Seng per Leggatt J; Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch). Note that English law 
is yet to embrace the idea of general implication of good faith into all contracts. 
38 See the decision in Khoury v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1984) 165 C.L.R. 622 : the courts in New South Wales have 
held that a duty to disclose is not an implied term but a common law duty imposed on the relationship between the insurer and 
the insured – See J. Tarr, “A growing good faith in contracts”, (2015)J.B.L. 410 
39 [2014] 3 S.C.R. 495 at [74] 
40 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] Q.B. 433;  
41 Ibid. Exception to this rule is in the area of long term relational contracts – See Globe Motors Inc. v TRW LucasVarity Electric 
Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ396, [67]‐[69] ( obiter per Beatson LJ); National Private Air Transport Services Company (National 
Air Services )Ltd v  Creditrade LLP and Anor [2016] EWHC 3342 (Ch), [275]‐[276] (per Asplin J) and Portsmouth City Council v  
Ensign Highways Ltd. [2015] EWHC 1969, [81] per Stuart J (TCC)  
42 Ibid, [439D‐G] 
43 This point has been reiterated in the recent case of Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland 
Ltd (Trading As Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ 200 at [105] 
44 Yam Seng per Leggatt; Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch) 
45  See Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (Trading As Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ 200 at 
[105]; Yam Seng at [121‐130] 
46 Even in this situations, there is an emerging understanding that such actions are warranted where the parties are in a 
relational contract – Yam Seng; Bristol Groundschool Ltd v Intelligent Data Capture Ltd [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch) 
47 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 789; [2016] 2 CLC, 272 at 290‐291 [45A‐E]; Ilkerler 
Otomotiv Sanayai ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi and another v Perkins Engines Co Ltd – the court rebuffed an attempt to imply good 
faith into a contract. 
48 E. McKendrick, Contract Law (9th Ed) pp.221–2. 
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The first is the position expressed by Bingham L.J, that is, English law 
has its own approach to dealing with matters good faith seeks to 
address. The second reason is the inherent individualism in English 
law; individuals are expected to freely negotiate and or perform 
agreed obligations without or with minimum external influence. The 
final reason is the uncertainty that an overriding concept of good faith 
is likely to introduce into English law; this will be in direct conflict with 
the cherished English law principle of certainty. 
 
The preferred English law alternative approach to a general principle 
of good faith was canvassed in the Interfoto case,49 and recently 
added to in the MSC Mediterranean Shipping case:50  
 
‘‘‘piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness’’, although it is well-recognised that broad concepts 
of fair dealing may be reflected in the court’s response to 
questions of construction and the implication of terms’.51 
  
The above statement by Moore-Bick LJ points to two approaches 
English courts use when addressing good faith related issues. The 
first is the use of diverse legal and equitable concepts to address 
unfairness whenever it is encountered. The second is more generic 
and discretionary in nature, that is, contract interpretation and 
implication of terms.52 Regarding the former, Bingham L.J in Interfoto 
provided the following examples: equity’s intervention to strike out 
unconscionable bargains,53 statutory imposition of exemption 
clauses54  and the common law’s position that certain contracts 
require utmost good faith and its approach to penalty clauses.55  Sir 
Rupert Jackson,56 in a recent lecture 57 questioned the necessity and 
value of express good faith clauses in contracts. He reiterated the 
argument that English law has developed concepts overtime which 
cater for different aspects of good faith. Further, he cited as an 
instance the role of the tort of deceit in addressing situations where 
                                      
49 [1989] Q.B. 433 
50 [2016] 2 CLC, 272 at 290‐291 [45A‐E] 
51 Ibid [45B‐C] 
52 A discussion of the extent to which the process of construction/interpretation of contracts has been used to address 
unfairness and good faith concerns is out with the scope of this piece.   
53 See also what A. Mugasha, “Good faith Obligations in Commercial Contracts” ‐ (1999) 27 Int'l Bus. Law. 355 at 356 refers to as 
conscience‐based good faith and the list of equitable devices which have been used to address them: bona fide purchaser defence 
against third parties, honesty‐based defences  in defamation such as fair comment qualified privilege;   duty not to contradict 
oneself – e.g. promissory estoppel which prevents a party from going back on his words, prohibition against conflict of interest 
in relationships of trust and confidence – e.g.  fiduciary relationships; duty not to abuse position of dominance – e.g. duress, 
undue  influence; economic duress,  rule against unconscionable bargain etc. See also A. D. Miller and R. Perry,  “Good Faith 
Performance”, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 689 at 700 (2013) ‐ the  authors refer to for instance estoppel, fraud, unconscionability, mistake 
as examples.   
54 E.g. The Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended), ss12‐15 
55 Interfoto [1989] Q.B. 433, 439 [F‐G] per Bingham L.J. 
56 A renowned justice of the English Court of Appeal 
57 R. Jackson, “Does Good Faith has any role in Construction Contracts?” Pinsent Mason Lecture in Hong Kong on 22nd 
November 2017 accessed on 5th December 2017 at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp‐content/uploads/2017/11/speech‐lj‐
jackson‐masons‐lecture‐hong‐kong.pdf 
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one party makes a false statement intending the other party to rely 
on it. Consequently, ‘an amorphous duty of “good faith” adds nothing 
to the duties imposed by the contract or by the law of tort’, he 
argued.58 Comparing English and French approaches to good faith, 
Santier59 observed that there is a tendency to contextualise good 
faith application and to resort to disparate concepts familiar to a given 
legal system to give effect to the true meaning of good faith. This is 
certainly true of the English system. 
 
With the foregoing discussion on the English approaches to good faith 
in mind, one needs to bear in mind that the NEC Conditions are of 
English origin. Whether one agrees with the view that the duty to act 
in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation connotes good faith or 
with Lord Justice Jackson’s view that any express reference to good 
faith in a contract is of limited value, it is imperative to examine the 
terms/concepts used in clause 10.1 of NEC3 and clause 10.2 of NEC4 
for their distinct import. This is more so as NEC3 and NEC4 Conditions 
do not use the term ’good faith’ at all. It is also important to ask 
whether similar concepts such as those embodied by the duty to act 
in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation have been used elsewhere 
in the law. Could it be that by simply interpreting this duty as a good 
faith provision, we miss the real significance of the concepts - ‘mutual 
trust’ and ‘co-operation’ - which are both well-known in English law? 
These concepts are examined next. 
Mutual Trust     
‘Mutual trust’ has been interpreted as imposing on parties a duty 
similar to that of a trustee of property.60 This view is problematic as 
it presumes that parties to the NEC Conditions enter into some kind 
of fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence. In Bristol and West 
Building Society v Mothew,61 the Court of Appeal defined a fiduciary 
as ‘someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in 
a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship 
of trust and confidence’.62 The Court continued, ‘the principal is 
entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary’. The Court had 
this to say about the nature of the obligation of a fiduciary: 
                                      
58 R. Jackson, “Does Good Faith has any role in Construction Contracts?” Pinsent Mason Lecture in Hong Kong on 22nd 
November 2017 accessed on 5th December 2017 at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp‐content/uploads/2017/11/speech‐lj‐
jackson‐masons‐lecture‐hong‐kong.pdf at [4.3] 
59 S. Saintier, “The elusive notion of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bete noire for the civil and the 
common law?” (2017) J.B.L. 441 
60 See T. Davis and P.N. Thurlow, “Good faith obligations in NEC contracts” (2016) Management, Procurement and Law, Vol 169, 
Issue MP4, 145.  
61 [1998] Ch. 1 at 18 [A‐B] 
62 ibid 
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A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit 
out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where 
his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his 
own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the 
informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an 
exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of 
fiduciary obligations.63 
The relationship between a Client and a Contractor under the NEC 
Conditions does not fit this description. The parties do not act for each 
other as a trustee will do for a beneficiary. There is no prohibition 
under the NEC Conditions requiring parties not to place themselves 
in a position where their duties and interest may conflict. Indeed, the 
parties act for their own benefits. A party’s interest is not 
subordinated to that of the other party. Lord Millett, in an extra-
judicial writing has suggested that it is inappropriate to impose 
fiduciary obligations on parties to purely commercial relationship ‘who 
deal with each other at arm’s length and can be expected to look after 
their own interest’.64 There is sufficient evidence to suggest that most 
courts do not view the obligation under clause 10.1 of NEC3 and 
similar provisions elsewhere as establishing a fiduciary relationship.65 
Tan66 summed up rather aptly the relationship between good faith 
and fiduciary relationship in the following words: 
‘The notion of good faith can be captured by situating it within 
a spectrum of norms of behaviour, above the pure and 
unconstrained pursuit of self-interest, but below the converse 
notion which involves subjugating one’s interests entirely to 
another’s (such as a fiduciary duty of loyalty). It has sometimes 
been characterised as a compromise between these two 
polarities, and described as requiring "loyalty to the promise" 
or "faithfulness to the agreed common purpose", namely 
requiring that the other party’s interests be taken into account, 
but only to the extent that this is already reflected in the nature 
of the intended bargain.’67 
Davis,68 a proponent of the legal trustee argument, has also 
contended that mutual trust in the context of clause 10 should imply 
a prohibition on each party ‘from detracting from the contractual and 
accrued rights of the other party’. This view certainly mirrors aspects 
                                      
63 ibid 
64 P. J. Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 214 at 217‐218. 
65 See the decision in Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd, Costain Limited v Tarmac Holdings Limited [2017] EWHC 
319 at [118‐ 121] (TCC) and Automasters Australia PTY Limited v Bruness PTY Limited [2002] WASC 286 
66 See Z. X. Tan, “Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐Yam Seng and Bhasin” (2016) J.B.L.420. 
67 Ibid at 439‐440 
68 T. Davis, “Clause 10.1: trust is not good faith” (2017) The NEC Users’ Group Newsletter, Issue No.87, 7 
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of the very concept Davis had previously dismissed (that is, good 
faith).  
Much can be learned from how similar concepts in other areas of law 
have been viewed and interpreted. In employment law, there is a 
general agreement on the existence of an implied term of ‘mutual 
trust and confidence’. Lord Steyn observed in Malik v Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation)69 that the advent of 
the implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence is ‘sound 
development’70 and is ‘established’.71 In the context of employment 
law, the concept connotes a ‘general obligation not to engage in 
conduct likely to undermine the trust and confidence required if the 
employment relationship is to continue in the manner the 
employment contract implicitly envisages.’72 It imposes an obligation 
on the Employer to ‘not, without reasonable and proper cause, 
conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between the 
employer and the employee’.73  
In Malik,74 the highest court in the United Kingdom acknowledged 
that the mutual trust and confidence duty covers ‘the great diversity 
of situations in which a balance has to be struck between an 
employer's interest in managing his business as he sees fit and the 
employee's interest in not being unfairly and improperly exploited’. 
The statement by the Supreme Court implies that the concept has 
‘many different aspects’ and applies to ‘differing circumstances.’75 It 
is an obligation imposed by law.76 It does not give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship.77 In Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd,78 the court described the mutual trust and confidence 
obligation as ‘the implied obligation of good faith’. The duty has also 
been described as ‘an employer’s obligation of fair dealing’,79 
underscoring the connections between this concept and good faith. 
In Johnson v Unisys Ltd,80 the court rejected an argument which 
suggested that the obligation is restricted to the employer only; it 
applies equally to the employee.81 
                                      
69 [1998]A.C. 20 at 46 
70 Ibid [46E] 
71 Ibid [46G] 
72 Ibid [35A] per Lord Nicholls 
73 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) [1998] A.C. 20 at [45F] 
74 Ibid [46D] 
75 D. Thomas QC, Keating on NEC3 (London, Sweet and Maxwell,2012) 10 
76 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13 at 24 
77 ibid 
78 [1991] 1 WLR 589 at 597G. 
79 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13 at 24 
80 ibid 
81 Ibid., at para 26 
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Judicial and academic examination of the concept of ‘mutual trust and 
confidence’ in employment law provide seven significant leads to 
understanding the concept of ‘mutual trust’ under NEC3 and NEC4. 
First, both the employment law concept (mutual trust and 
confidence) and the NEC concept (mutual trust) have some 
connection with the long-standing duty to co-operate. This is a 
significant indication that the concepts have a shared meaning, scope 
and antecedents. It has been noted that the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence originated from the ‘general duty of co-operation 
between contracting parties’.82 In the NEC Conditions, the idea 
‘mutual trust’ is interestingly paired with the concept of ‘co-
operation’. 
Secondly, mutual trust and confidence is a general obligation 
applicable to protean situations. The same point can be made for the 
concept of mutual trust under NEC3 and NEC4. The language of the 
NEC clause 10 duty leaves no one in doubt that it is meant to be a 
general obligation. The duty may apply to many clauses under the 
NEC Conditions of Contract. 
Thirdly, the employment law duty of ‘mutual trust and confidence’ is 
mainly about conduct of the parties, especially the employer. There 
is a general expectation that parties’ behaviour will accord with the 
manner the ‘contract implicitly envisages’.83 It is submitted that 
‘mutual trust’ under NEC3 and NEC4 carries similar connotation.  The 
NEC’s ethos and procedures clearly promote certain ‘manner of 
conduct’ crucial to the successful implementation of the contract – 
parties are expected not to act in a manner that undermines this 
expectation. Further, the obligation of mutual trust and confidence in 
employment law does not create a fiduciary relationship.84 This is 
equally true for the obligation to act in a spirit of mutual trust under 
the NEC Conditions.  
Fifthly, both concepts promote the idea of preservation of relationship 
required to keep the contracts viable. The duty to act in a spirit of 
mutual trust and co-operation under NEC3 and NEC4 is about parties 
working together (collaborating) to achieve project goals. The duty 
emphasises the relational nature of the contract and the importance 
of maintaining the right kind of relationship; the success or failure of 
the contract largely depends on this. Sixthly, the concept of ‘mutual 
trust and confidence’ is also about compliance with relevant contract 
                                      
82 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) [1998] A.C. 20 at [45H] per Lord Steyn referring to B. 
Hepple and P. O'Higgins, Employment Law, 4th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell,1981), pp. 134‐135, at [291‐292]. 
83 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) [1998] A.C. 20 at [35A] per Lord Nicholls 
84 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13 at 24 
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terms. As an implied term, it operates to give efficacy to the express 
terms of the contract. ‘It must be read consistently with the express 
words of the contract’.85 The mutual trust concept under NEC is part 
of an express term in the NEC Condition and is also tied to the parties’ 
obligation to comply with the terms of the contract.86   
The seventh illuminating lesson from judicial discussion of the 
employment law concept of ‘mutual trust and confidence’ is that it is 
about achieving balance between interests of the parties. One party’s 
behaviour in pursuit of its interest can negatively affect the other;87 
the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence frowns on any 
conduct which undermines the interest of another party. This appears 
to be the import of ‘mutual trust’ under NEC3 and NEC4 as well.  
From the foregoing, it is noticeable that the concept ‘mutual trust’ in 
the NEC Conditions shares significant common features with the 
employment law concept of ‘mutual trust and confidence’ in three key 
areas: 
1. Nature - they are both general obligations; 
2. Scope - they apply to protean situations and conducts; and 
3. Purpose - they focus on preservation of relationships, 
compliance with contractual obligations and balance of party 
interests. 
Though the context in which the concepts in employment law and 
construction law apply may differ, it is argued that the basic 
operating principles are the same. To act in a spirit of mutual trust 
under the NEC Conditions therefore requires parties to the NEC3 and 
NEC4 Conditions to do the following: 
(1) Acknowledge the relational nature of the contract they 
are committing to; 
(2) Accept that a certain manner of conduct is implicitly 
envisaged as vital to the efficacy of the contract; 
(3) Act in a manner that preserves and promotes the ethos, 
objectives and terms of the NEC Conditions. 
(4) Act in a manner that preserves relationship required to 
keep the contract viable. 
(5) Act in a manner that does not undermine the interest of 
other parties.  
                                      
85 ibid 
86 See NEC4 ECC, cl. 10.1 & 2 
87 This is the case in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) [1998] A.C. 20 
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Judges, arbitrators and adjudicators interpreting clause 10.1 of NEC3 
and Clause 10.2 of NEC4 can benefit greatly from these existing 
judicial insights into the concept of mutual trust and confidence.  
Co-operation 
Duty to cooperate is not a new concept.88 It is well known in English 
law. It may be statutory,89 express90 or implied.91  It is encountered 
in areas of the law such as planning,92 insolvency93 and landlord and 
tenancy.94 It has been noted that parties to a civil proceedings have 
a duty to co-operate to achieve the overriding objective of the English 
Civil Procedure Rule, 1998 (CPR).95  In its statutory or express form, 
the duty operates like any other provision or clause in a statute or 
written contract. As an implied term, the duty to co-operate may be 
incorporated into a contract within the narrow confines of the criteria 
for implying terms into agreements as set out in the Privy Council 
case of BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings96 and 
affirmed and further explained  by the UK Supreme Court in Marks & 
Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd.97 
A duty to co-operate will be implied into a contract only if it is obvious 
the parties intended it to be part of the contract,98 or failure to do so 
will mean the contract will lack business efficacy.99 If what has been 
agreed to be done can only be accomplished if a party or parties do 
what is necessary to be done on their part, the court is likely to imply 
a duty to co-operate into the relevant contract to give it business 
efficacy.100 In Mackay v. Dick,101 Lord Blackburn captured this 
principle in the following terms: 
…where in a written contract it appears that both parties have 
agreed that something shall be done, which cannot effectually 
                                      
88 See Luxor (Eastbourne)Ltd v Cooper [1941]AC 108 at 118 (obiter per Viscount Simon) HL; Allridge (Builders) Ltd. v Grand 
Actual Ltd (1997) 55 Con LR 91; see also N. Baatz,’ Problem management/ Dispute resolution in partnering contracts’  (2008) 
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers Management, Procurement and Law 161, Issue MP3, 115 
89 See Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (as amended),s.33A  
90 See e.g. NEC4 ECC, cl.10.2  
91 Globe Motors Inc. & Ors v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd & Anor.[2016] EWCA Civ 396 at [67] per Beatson LJ 
92 R. (on the application of St Albans City and District Council) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] 
EWHC 1751 (Admin) 
93 Harris v Official Receiver [2016] EWHC 3433 [14] (CH), Pearse v Lord [2015] EWHC 3046 (Ch) and Oraki and another v 
Bramston and another [2015] EWHC 2046 at [144] (Ch) 
94 Wild Duck Ltd v Smith [2017] EWHC 1252 (Ch) 
95 Ecila Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University Foundation NHS Trust [2016] EWHC 3032 at [63] (QB) per Mr Justice Warby 
96 180 C.L.R. 266 
97 [2015] UKSC 72. See  also Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206 at 227 per MacKinnon LJ; The Moorcock 
(1889) 14 PD 64, 68 per Bowen LJ and Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd [1918] 1 KB 592, 605 per Scrutton 
LJ. 
98 See Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206 at 227 per MacKinnon LJ 
99 See The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64, 68 per Bowen LJ; Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd [1918] 1 KB 592, 
605 per Scrutton LJ; BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings180 C.L.R. 266; and Marks & Spencer Plc v BNP Paribas 
Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72. 
100 Ibid. See also Swallowfalls Ltd v Monaco Yachting and Technologies SAM [2014] EWCA Civ 186 
101 (1881) 6 App Cas 251 
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be done unless both concur in doing it, the construction of the 
contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be 
done on his part for the carrying out of that thing…102  
Indeed, it may be argued that the NEC Conditions fall into the 
category of written contracts Lord Blackburn referred to in Mackay v. 
Dick.103 The NEC Conditions, by their very nature and procedures, 
require co-operation to be effectual. It is likely that even without 
express terms such as one captured by clause 10.2 of NEC4 ECC, the 
courts may be inclined to imply a duty to co-operate into different 
aspects of the NEC Conditions on the basis of Mackay.104  
That said, the reality is that the requirement to act in a spirit of co-
operation is an express contractual term under NEC3 and NEC4. 
Parties, the Project Manager and the Supervisor are expressly 
enjoined to co-operate in the management of procedures such as 
early warning, payment, programme and compensation events.105 
For instance, under clause 15(3) of the NEC4 ECC, individuals who 
attend early warning meetings are under obligation to ‘co-operate’ in 
making and considering proposals for the avoidance or reduction of 
an early warning matter and all other decisions to be considered at 
the meeting.106 Under clause 25.1 of NEC3 ECC and NEC4 ECC, the 
contractor is obligated to ‘co-operate’ with others in providing and 
obtaining information required in connection with the Works and the 
Working Areas. The obligation to co-operate is not limited to 
situations where the form expressly requires parties to co-operate 
but appears to extend to relevant terms under both NEC3 and NEC4 
where co-operation may be required for a procedure to be effective. 
This is the import of the phrase ‘acting in a spirit of…’ which precedes 
the concepts ‘mutual trust’ and ‘co-operation’.  
What then does the duty to co-operate or act in a spirit of co-
operation entail? In the Australian case of Butt v M’Donald,107Griffith 
CJ sitting in the Supreme Court of Queensland observed that the duty 
to co-operate requires that a party ‘do all such things as are 
necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the benefit of 
the contract.’108  This does not necessarily imply that the party in 
question will have to forego its interest in order to ensure that the 
                                      
102 Mackay v. Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251 at 263, HL per Lord Blackburn 
103 (1881) 6 App Cas 251 
104 ibid 
105 NEC, NEC4 User Guide: Managing an Engineering and Construction Contract (2017) Vol.4, Chapter 2, p.3  
106 See NEC3 ECC, cl. 16(3) of NEC3 
107 (1896) 7 QLJ 68. See also J. M. Paterson, “Good Faith Duties in Contract Performance” (2014) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal, 14:2, 283‐309, DOI:10.1080/14729342.2015.1047655  
108 Ibid at 70‐71 
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other party’s interest is satisfied. It means parties must think ‘win-
win’; they should act to preserve their mutual interests.  
Examples of application of duty to co-operate in different areas of 
English law, particularly planning law, provide some guidance on 
what the duty to co-operate entails in practice. In R (on the 
application of Central Bedfordshire Council) v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government,109 Paterson J observed in 
relation to section 33A of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 
2004110 that the duty to co-operate entails ‘an active and ongoing 
process of co-operation’.111 In developing this idea further, Sir Ross 
Cranston in R. (on the application of St Albans City and District 
Council) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government,112 another case involving local authority planning, 
observed that the duty to co-operate is not a duty to agree; ‘whether 
or not there is an agreement is not determinative of the duty to co-
operate’.113 It is also not a duty to balance instances of co-operation 
against instances where there is lack thereof.114  There must be an 
active, ongoing collaborative engagement even in the face of 
an impasse.115 The contractual duty to act in a spirit of co-operation 
under the NEC Conditions should thus be seen in this light. The duty 
to cooperate under the NEC Conditions entails doing all that is 
necessary to ensure that contractual goals are achieved by 
maintaining active, ongoing and productive collaborative 
engagement even in the face of disagreements. Parties must co-
operate during risk meetings.116 In the assessment of compensation 
events, parties are expected to act honestly and transparently, not 
exploit each other.117 This duty extends to all situations under the 
NEC forms where party engagement with each other is required to 
make the process workable. 
The phrase ‘in a spirit of’ connotes looking beyond what the ‘letter’118 
may state about ‘mutual trust’ and ‘co-operation’, to the very essence 
of the concepts used. The duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and 
co-operation under the NEC Conditions thus implies that parties will 
come to the contract with a frame of mind which acknowledges the 
ethos of the contract and the fact that it will only work as intended if 
                                      
109 [2015] EWHC 2167 (Admin) 
110 On duty to co‐operate by local authorities in planning matters 
111 R (on the application of Central Bedfordshire Council) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] 
EWHC 2167 at [50] (Admin) 
112 [2017] EWHC 1751 (Admin) 
113 Ibid., para 47 
114 R. (on the application of St Albans City and District Council) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
[2017] EWHC 1751 at [47,51‐53] (Admin) 
115 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
116 NEC3 ECC, cl.16 (3); NEC4 ECC, cl.15 (3). 
117 NEC, NEC4 User Guide: Managing an Engineering and Construction Contract (2017) Vol.4, Chapter 2, p.3 
118 In our context, the NEC Conditions 
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the parties act in a certain manner: having confidence in each other’s 
credibility and on that basis, engaging each other actively, 
consistently and collaboratively on every facet of the contractual 
process. There is an aspect of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual 
trust and co-operation which is aspirational, but that should not, and 
indeed, has not stopped the courts from identifying acts which 
blatantly undermine co-operation and party interests, and are 
calculated and or likely to destroy or seriously damage the 
relationship of confidence and trust between the Client and the 
contractor. Such acts have been regarded as constituting a breach of 
this duty.119 
 
Mutual Trust and Co-operation: Breach and Remedy 
Do the NEC Conditions make provision for determination of breach of 
the clause 10 duty and likely consequences? Have the English courts 
had an opportunity to deal with these questions and how did they 
approach them? What has been the approach of the English courts to 
determining breach of express good faith clauses generally in the 
English context and what lessons could be learned  from this 
approach in terms of  gauging the overall trajectory of the discourse 
on contractual good faith in the United Kingdom? 
Contractual Perspective  
Potential or actual breach of NEC4 Clause 10.2 or the equivalent 
provision in NEC3 does not automatically result in a court action. The 
NEC Conditions provide a contractual mechanism to address an 
anticipated or actual breach. First of all, parties must resort to the 
early warning mechanism under clause 15 of NEC4 ECC as soon as 
they become aware of any potential breach of this duty.120 Clause 
15(1) mandates the Project Manager or the Contractor to give an 
early warning by notifying the other party of any matter which could 
‘increase the total of the prices, delay completion, delay meeting a 
key date or impair the performance of the works in use’. Any matter 
likely to increase the contractor’s cost must also be ‘notified’ and 
recorded in the Early Warning Register. The parties must then use an 
early warning meeting to attempt to resolve potential eventualities 
and or differences. Parties attending the early warning meeting are 
under obligation to co-operate in making and considering proposals, 
looking for solutions and making specific decisions to address the 
issues raised.121 Where the issue raised at the early warning meeting 
                                      
119 See the decision in Northern Ireland Housing Executive v Healthy Buildings (Ireland) Limited[2017] NIQB 43 
120 The language of this clause is sufficiently broad to accommodate a notification relating to alleged breach of cl 10 duty. 
121 NEC4, Clause 15.3 
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relates to potential or anticipated breach of the mutual trust and or 
co-operation duty, the parties are still required to ‘co-operate’ to find 
solutions to such situation. Where there is lack of mutual trust, it is 
difficult (but not impossible) to envisage how the parties may ‘co-
operate’ to find solution to the anticipated difficulty. It will be 
interesting to see how this plays out in reality.  
Where parties fail to resolve anticipated concern with compliance with 
NEC4 ECC clause 10.2 at the early warning stage, this may result in 
actual non-compliance or breach. It is clear from the study of the NEC 
Conditions that the drafters expected breach of this duty to be treated 
like any other breach under the Conditions of contract. There are two 
discernible contractual consequences of a breach of NEC4 ECC clause 
10.2 duty. First of all, such a breach will be subject to clause 60.18 
of the NEC4 Conditions which provides that ‘a breach of contract by 
the Client which is not one of the other compensation events in the 
contract’ qualifies as a compensation event if it has a time and cost 
impact.122  Secondly, failure to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation can result in acts and omissions (breach of terms other 
than clause 10) which constitute compensation events and are thus 
already subject to the compensation event procedure.123 Examples of 
such scenarios are covered by clause 60.1(2),124 (3),125 (5)126 and 
(16)127 of the NEC4 Conditions.  
Regardless of the nature of the breach of NEC4 ECC clause 10.2 duty, 
it is subject to the same process of assessment as any other 
compensation event. Clause 62.1 of NEC4 ECC makes it possible for 
the Project Manager and the Contractor to discuss ways of addressing 
notified compensation events. The procedure for assessing 
compensation events as set out under clause 63 of NEC4 ECC applies. 
For instance, where a party fails to act in a spirit of mutual trust and 
co-operation and as a result access to site is delayed for two months, 
which in turn affects the Completion Date, clause 63 allows the delay 
to the completion date to be assessed ‘as the length of time that, due 
to the compensation event, planned Completion is later than planned 
Completion as shown on the Accepted Programme current at the 
dividing date’.  
                                      
122 It should be noted that it is not every alleged breach of contract (cl 10 duty) which may qualify as a compensation event. It 
must be established that the alleged breach of clause 10 has an impact on Defined cost, Completion or a Key date (cl.61.4). 
123 Other than breaches under Clause 60.18 
124 The Client does not allow access to and use of each part of the Site by the later of its access date and the date for access 
shown on the Accepted Programme. 
125 The Client does not provide something which it is to provide by the date shown in the Accepted Programme. 
126 The Client or Others do not work within the times shown on the Accepted Programme, do not work within the conditions 
stated in the Scope or carry out work on the Site that is not stated in the Scope. 
127 The Client does not provide materials, facilities and samples for tests and inspections as stated in the Scope 
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The NEC4 ECC places a limit on the remedy the innocent party will 
be entitled to when there is a breach.  Clause 63.6 provides that ‘the 
rights of the Client and the Contractor to changes to the Prices, the 
Completion Date and the Key Dates are their only rights in respect of 
a compensation event’. In effect, the innocent party is entitled to 
price adjustment and extension of time but not damages. The NEC 
User Guide,128 notes in relation to clause 63.6 that, 
If any of the compensation events occurs, the Parties’ sole 
remedy is to use the compensation event procedure. 
Therefore, if the Client breaches the contract the Contractor 
must use this route (see clause 60.1(18)), rather than pursuing 
damages. This prevents either party from trying to circumvent 
the time limits and processes in the contract.129 
From the foregoing, there is a contractual process for parties to follow 
to either pre-empt breach of NEC4 clause 10(2) or address actual 
breach when it occurs. There is a standard for what will constitute a 
significant breach of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation; the alleged breach must have an impact on Defined cost, 
Completion or a Key date.130  If a party fails to act in a spirit of mutual 
trust and co-operation and the failure does not result in time and or 
cost impact on the contract, such a breach will attract no remedy 
under the NEC Conditions. So when parties engage with each other 
either at the early warning stage or the compensation event stage, 
unless the parties disagree on which party is responsible for the 
alleged breach of clause 10.2 of NEC4 ECC,131 one of the key 
questions will be whether the alleged breach has had cost and time 
impact on the contract. If the answer is in the affirmative the 
aggrieved party will be entitled to price adjustment and or extension 
of time only; damages and all other remedies are excluded. Unlike 
the situation under the English Insurance Act, 2015132 where no 
remedy is provided for breach of the wide duty of utmost good faith 
under the Act, the NEC Conditions make a better provision in this 
regard.  
Judicial attitude towards NEC Clause 10 concepts 
Compliance with the early warning and compensation event 
procedures do not always result in mutually acceptable outcomes. 
Consequently, parties sometimes resort to the dispute resolution 
clauses in the NEC Conditions. The first point of call for dispute 
                                      
128 NEC, NEC User Guide – Managing an Engineering and Construction Contract (2017) Vol.4, 64 
129 Emphasis added 
130 See NEC4 ECC, cl.61.4 
131 In which case this may become the subject‐matter to be determined through the dispute resolution process. 
132  This amended the Marine Insurance Act 1906.  
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resolution under the NEC3 Conditions is adjudication. Parties 
dissatisfied with the adjudication outcome have a choice to resort to 
a Tribunal which may be a court or an arbitral tribunal. Under the 
NEC4 ECC, both Options W1 and W2 require parties to refer disputes 
to party representatives mandated to use any alternative dispute 
resolution of choice to help address a dispute before resorting to 
adjudication. Parties dissatisfied with the outcome of an adjudication 
hearing can then proceed to an agreed tribunal. Parties who choose 
NEC4 ECC Option W3 are required to submit disputes to a Dispute 
Avoidance Board first and then to the court or arbitration.   
 
So how have the English courts dealt with questions of breach and 
consequences of the clause 10 duty? Some NEC-related disputes end 
up in court but these are few and far between,133 and even fewer 
cases have dealt with NEC3 ECC Clause 10 and or NEC 4 ECC Clause 
10.2.134 In Northern Ireland Housing Executive v Healthy Buildings 
(Ireland) Limited,135 the court was called upon to determine whether 
a compensation event was to be assessed based on actual cost or 
forecasted cost. It relied primarily on Clauses 63-65 of the NEC3 
Professional Services Contract136 and concluded that the assessment 
should be founded on the actual cost. In coming to this conclusion, 
Deeny J. considered the principle of contractual interpretation which 
requires the contract to be interpreted as a whole and acknowledged 
the need to consider what he referred to as ‘other factors’. These, in 
the view of the judge, included the extent to which the defendant’s 
conduct aligned with the philosophy of the NEC Conditions including 
the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation. He 
observed as follows: 
First of all, it is a cardinal principle of contractual interpretation 
that one should look at the agreement overall. This particular 
contract begins with the agreement that the employer and the 
consultant shall act "in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation"(10.1). It seems to me that a refusal by the 
consultant to hand over his actual time sheets and records for 
work he did during the contract is entirely antipathetic to a 
spirit of mutual trust and co-operation. 
The respected judge concluded that the conduct of the defendant (in 
withholding the actual cost from the employer and the Tribunal) did 
not comply with the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation but crucially failed to provide the rationale for this 
conclusion. It appears that, to the judge in this case, the clause 10 
                                      
133 Atkins Limited v The Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWHC 139 (TCC) [9] per Akenhead J: ‘Very few cases involving 
material disputes as to the interpretation of the NEC3 Conditions have made their way through to reported court decisions.’ 
134 These include the following: Northern Ireland Housing Executive v Healthy Buildings (Ireland) Ltd [2017] NIQB 43; Mears Ltd 
v Shoreline Housing Partnership Ltd [2015] EWHC 1396 (TCC) [72]; and Costain v Tarmac [2017] EWHC 319 (TCC) 
135 [2017] NIQB 43. 
136 On assessment of compensation events. 
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duty is about the standard of conduct expected from the parties. In 
his view, the conduct of the defendant did not meet this standard. 
Useful as it may be, this decision does not help our understanding of 
the import of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation. It also offers no insight at all into what the consequence 
of a breach of the duty should be. At best, the respected judge’s 
comment  on the clause 10 duty constituted an ancillary point which 
was meant to augment his interpretation of clauses 60-65 of the 
NEC3 Professional Services Contract (June 2005).  
In Costain Limited v Tarmac Holdings Limited,137 the parties had 
entered into a sub-contract which incorporated two different sets of 
agreements; a NEC3 Short Supply Contract and an amended NEC3 
Framework Contract. The Framework contract related to seeking and 
providing quotations whilst the Supply Short Contract related 
specifically to supply of concrete for a safety barrier between 
junctions 28-31 on the M1 motorway in England. The concrete 
supplied was found to be defective. The dispute resolution clause in 
the Short Supply Contract had a restricted schedule on adjudication, 
time bar provisions and a second stage arbitration whilst the 
Framework Contract allowed adjudication at any time and litigation 
thereafter. The claimant having had its claim for the defective goods 
dismissed on a time bar ground by an adjudicator, made a claim 
before the High Court. It was this action that the Defendant sought 
to stay and refer to arbitration.  
Among the issues agreed was the question of relevance of the clause 
10 duty, that is, the obligation to act in a spirit of mutual trust and 
co-operation. The claimant had sought to argue that the defendants 
had acted contrary to prior representations made to them and thus 
acted contrary to the clause 10 duty. The claimants had also 
essentially argued that the defendant was under obligation per the 
clause 10 duty to draw its attention to the nature, scope and potential 
effect of the dispute clause in the Supply short contract. The court 
presided over by Justice Coulson dismissed both arguments by the 
claimant on the ground that the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust 
and co-operation does not place such obligations on the defendant.  
The arguments of the respected judge in support of the court’s 
decision merits some further analysis. Firstly, the court relied on 
‘Keating on NEC3’138 which equates the duty to act in a spirit of 
mutual trust and co-operation to the much broader concept of good 
faith. On this point, two observations are made here. The clause 10 
                                      
137 [2017] EWHC 319 (TCC) 
138 D. Thomas QC, Keating on NEC3 (London, Sweet and Maxwell,2012) 
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duty under NEC3 and NEC4 do not use the term ‘good faith’. The 
drafters used specific terms – ‘mutual trust’ and ‘co-operation’. It is 
submitted that bearing in mind the broad spectrum of the concept of 
good faith, it is unlikely that the concepts used in clause 10 of the 
NEC Conditions were intended to be ‘substitutes’ for good faith in its 
broadest sense. At best, the duty may cover some disparate sub-
principles of good faith such as ‘duty to co-operate’ and ‘duty not to 
improperly exploit’.  
Secondly, some uneasiness was noticeable from the decision of the 
court139 regarding embracing every good faith concept as a 
component of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-
operation under the NEC Conditions. For instance, the court was 
reluctant to accept that ‘mutual trust and co-operation’ entails an 
obligation to act fairly. Having concluded that there was no breach of 
the clause 10 duty, the court did not discuss the consequence or 
remedy for such a breach. It is worth noting that the exercise of 
determining the meaning and possible breach of the clause 10 duty 
was through contract interpretation. 
 In TSG Building Services Ltd v South Anglia Housing,140 the parties’ 
gas servicing (and related works) agreement had a provision similar 
in many respects to the wording in Clause 10.1 of the NEC3 ECC.141 
The contract gave the parties unconditional right to terminate at any 
time. The defendant terminated early the contract with a four year 
duration. The adjudicator decided that the contractor was entitled to 
some payments as a result of the early termination. One of the 
questions for the court was whether the duty to act in a spirit of 
mutual trust and co-operation imposed any ‘constraints, condition or 
qualification’ on the rights of the parties to terminate for convenience. 
As with the judges in Northern Ireland Housing Executives and 
Costain, the Court treated the legal issue as ‘a matter of construction’ 
and resorted to precedents on the construction of commercial 
contracts.142  Pursuant to the interpretation exercise, the Court held 
that the scope of the said Clause 1.1 (akin to the clause 10 duty under 
NEC 3 and 4) did not cover the expressly agreed term on termination 
                                      
139 Ibid. para [123‐124] 
140 [2013] EWHC 1151 (TCC) 
141 Clause 1.1: ‘1.1 The Partnering Team members shall work together and individually in a spirit of trust, fairness and mutual co‐
operation for the benefit of the Term Programme, within the scope of their agreed roles, expertise and responsibilities as stated 
in the Partnering Documents, and all their respective obligations under the Partnering Contract shall be construed within the 
scope of such roles, expertise and responsibilities, and in all matters governed by the Partnering Contract they shall act reasonably 
and without delay.’ 
142 [2013] EWHC 1151 (TCC), [32]. At paragraph 36 of the  judgment, the respected  judge noted as follows:  ‘This type of case 
encourages a textual but also a contextual interpretation of commercial contracts. So it is that one needs to consider not just 
what the words in Clause 1.1 mean verbally but also what from looking at the contract overall they are intended to apply to. It is 
legitimate to consider whether they are intended to apply to the termination provisions at all’. 
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for convenience.143 The judge in this case also gave no indication as 
to possible remedy for breach of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual 
trust and co-operation.  
In Mears Ltd v Shoreline Housing Partnership Ltd,144  a contractor 
who had been employed to repair and maintain properties owned by 
a landlord sought to recover £300,000 which the landlord had 
deducted from payments due it. Akenhead J. rejected arguments by 
Mears Ltd that Shoreline, in a spirit of the values of the NEC contract, 
ought not to have taken advantage of them by failing to warn them 
that they (Shoreline) will adhere to the strict terms of the contract. 
The judge did not find any improper conduct on the part of the 
landlord and thus found that the clause 10 duty has not been 
breached.145 Once again, the court did not provide detailed analysis 
of the conduct of the landlord other than stating that, ‘I am not 
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was any such (what 
could be described as Machiavellian) conduct on the part of 
Shoreline’.146  Such enterprise would have been fruitless as the court 
was of the view that the obligation to act in a spirit of mutual trust 
and co-operation should not prevent either party from relying on the 
freely agreed terms of the contract. 
The cases which have dealt with the duty to act in a spirit of mutual 
trust and co-operation discussed above share some common 
features. Firstly, they did not attempt an explanation of the two main 
concepts in the duty namely, mutual trust and co-operation. In 
Costain, the judge attempted an explanation of the clause 10 duty 
but only went as far as equating it with good faith. Secondly, in nearly 
all cases, the judges concluded that clause 10 has not been breached 
without detailed analysis of the impugned conducts.  Thirdly, in all 
the cases involving NEC3 ECC clause 10, the judges gave no 
indication of the consequences of breach and the likely remedy. In 
Northern Ireland Housing Executive, the judge discussed the duty to 
act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation as part of his approach 
to contract interpretation, found that the duty had been breached but 
failed to discuss the consequence of the breach. Finally, the common 
approach to the determination of breach (or otherwise) of the duty 
to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation by the courts was 
by contract interpretation.  
                                      
143 Similarly, in the recent case of Monk v Largo [2016] EWHC 1837 (Comm), the court held that an absolute right to terminate 
is not constrained by an obligation of good faith. 
144 [2015] EWHC 1396 (TCC) [para 72] 
145 Ibid [72] 
146 ibid 
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Attitudes of English Court’s to express Good faith clauses 
Earlier works by Santier and Tan have examined this issue in some 
detail.147 Two developments are observable from the relevant 
literature and cases on how the English courts have approached the 
interpretation of contracts with express good faith clauses. Firstly, 
the courts generally interpret express good faith clauses narrowly. 
Secondly, they generally view good faith (where it has come up for 
consideration) as a standard/ social norm which must be complied 
with. Each point is examined briefly.  
On the first observation, Tan148 found that the courts will usually limit 
the application of express good faith clauses to specific provisions and 
are in most cases unwilling to allow such clauses to operate as 
overriding principles.149 The English courts have held that, subject to 
an express agreement to the contrary, clauses in the nature of the 
mutual trust and co-operation obligation under NEC3 and NEC4 do 
not supersede other expressly agreed contractual rights of parties. In 
Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Ltd,150 a party to a 
development agreement with a revenue–sharing provision and a 
good faith clause sued for damages for repudiatory breach. The 
defendant had failed to commence construction of dwelling houses 
on the due date as per the agreement and had unsuccessfully 
attempted to persuade the claimant to renegotiate the terms of the 
agreement to reflect the economic downturn and its effect on 
property prices in 2008. In opposing the action for damages, the 
defendant argued that the claimant had breached the good faith 
clause as a result of its refusal to renegotiate the terms of the 
agreement. It was held that the good faith clause did not require 
parties to give up freely negotiated rights and benefits under the 
contract.  
In the Court of Appeal case of Mid Essex NHS Trust v Compass Group 
UK and Ireland Ltd151, the question of the extent to which the general 
duty of good faith can constrain/restrict other express provisions of 
the contract came up for consideration. Addressing this issue, the 
Court of Appeal (per Beatson LJ) observed as follows: 
                                      
147 See S. Saintier, “The elusive notion of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bete noire for the civil and the 
common law?” (2017) J.B.L. 441 at 453 and Z. X. Tan, “Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐Yam Seng 
and Bhasin” (2016) J.B.L.420 at 429‐433 
148 Z. X. Tan, “Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐Yam Seng and Bhasin” (2016) J.B.L.420 at 428‐429 
149 See Mid Essex NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 200 , the court held that the provision on co‐
operation  applied to the provision on transmission of information but not the discretion to award service failure points – See Z. 
X. Tan, “Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐Yam Seng and Bhasin” (2016) J.B.L.420 at 432.   
150 [2010] EWHC 1632 (TCC) 
151 [2013] EWCA Civ 200 
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In a situation where a contract makes…specific provision, in my 
judgment, care must be taken not to construe a general and 
potentially open-ended obligation such as an obligation to “co-
operate” or “to act in good faith” as covering the same ground 
as other, more specific, provisions, lest it cut across those more 
specific provisions and any limitations in them.”152 
 
The court eventually decided that whilst the duty to co-operate 
applies to terms on transmission of information, it did not extend to 
the entire contract including the terms dealing with the exercise of 
discretion in the award of points for service failure. The idea of a 
general open-ended contractual provision superseding a more 
specific provision was also rejected by Mr. Justice Akenhead in TSG 
Building Services Ltd v South Anglia Housing.153  Here, whilst the 
Court agreed that the good faith obligation will apply to the 
performance of roles under the contract, it was not persuaded that it 
extended to the issue of termination for convenience.154  
 
The decisions in Gold Group Properties Ltd, Mid Essex NHS Trust and 
TSG Building Services Ltd on the interaction between good faith 
clauses and other express terms generally accords with the language 
of clause 10.1 of NEC3 and 10.2 of NEC4. Clause 10.1 of NEC3 states 
in part, that one of the primary obligations of the parties is to act as 
stated in the contract. That obligation is not to be superseded by the 
requirement of the second limb of the clause which states that parties 
shall act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation. NEC4 makes this 
position even clearer. The NEC4 User Guide155 states expressly 
regarding Clause10.2 on the obligation of mutual trust and co-
operation, that the sub-clause does not change the obligation of the 
parties and the two key administrators under the NEC4 contract. 
On the second observation, Santier156 notes in relation to assessment 
of breach of good faith in the English and French context that judges 
tend to view good faith as a ‘standard, a social contractual norm’ 
when determining a breach. This was the case in Yam Seng, where 
Leggatt J discussing this subject observed as follows: 
In addition to honesty, there are other standards of commercial 
dealing which are so generally accepted that the contracting 
parties would reasonably be understood to take them as read 
                                      
152 ibid, para 154 
153 [2013] EWHC 1151 (TCC) 
154 Similarly, in the recent case of Monk v Largo [2016] EWHC 1837 (Comm), the court held that an absolute right to terminate 
is not constrained by an obligation of good faith. 
155 NEC, NEC4 User Guide: Managing an Engineering and Construction Contract (2017) Vol.4, Chapter 2, p.3 
156 S. Saintier, “The elusive notion of good  faith  in  the performance of a contract, why still a bete noire  for  the civil and  the 
common law?” (2017) J.B.L. 441 at 453 
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without explicitly stating them in their contractual document. A 
key aspect of good faith, as I see it, is the observance of such 
standards. Put the other way round, not all bad faith conduct 
would necessarily be described as dishonest. Other epithets 
which might be used to describe such conduct include 
‘improper’, ‘commercially unacceptable’ or ‘unconscionable’.157 
This view reflects one of the popular theoretical positions on how 
breach of good faith is assessed in the United States.158  The 
proponent, Burton,159 argues that good faith is always preceded by 
the exercise of discretion and where the exercise of such contractual 
discretion is used to reclaim forgone opportunities there is a breach 
of good faith.160 Breach, according to Burton, is ‘determined by an 
objective standard, focusing on the expectations of reasonable 
persons in the position of the dependent parties’.161 As Tan162 points 
out, reference to objective standards or norms presupposes that they 
are undisputed and generally agreed. However, this is not the 
case.163  
Express good faith clauses, like any other clause in a contract, are 
subject to the same principles of contractual interpretation. In the 
United Kingdom, the question of good faith is part of the broader 
debate about the place of textualism and contextualism in contractual 
interpretation.164 Ultimately, the prevailing approach is that captured 
in the opinion of Lord Hodge JSC in the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court in Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd,165 that is: 
The court’s task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the 
language which the parties have chosen to express their 
agreement. It has long been accepted that this is not a literalist 
exercise focused solely on a parsing of the wording of the 
particular clause but that the court must consider the contract 
                                      
157 Yam Seng [138]. It appears these comments from Leggatt J were inspired by the decision of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234, where Priestley JA observed that: 
‘… people generally,  including  judges and other  lawyers,  from all  strands of  the community, have grown used  to  the courts 
applying standards of fairness to contract which are wholly consistent with the existence in all contracts of a duty upon the parties 
of good faith and fair dealing  in  its performance.  In my view this  is  in these days the expected standard, and anything  less  is 
contrary to prevailing community expectations.’ 
158 S. J. Burton, “Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform in Good Faith”, 94 Harv. L. REV. 369, 369‐71 (1980). 
The other theoretical approach to determining breach is the ‘excluder’ principle popularised by R. S. Summers, " ‘Good Faith’ in 
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code”, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 262. This author argues 
that instead of a narrow definition of good faith, judges should rather focus on forms of bad faith which have been ruled out in 
previous cases and work his way to the current situation either by direct application or analogy to prior determinations. 
159 S. J. Burton, “Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform in Good Faith”, 94 Harv. L. REV. 369, 369‐71 (1980). 
160 A. D. Miller and R. Perry, “Good Faith Performance”, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 689 at 706 (2013) 
161 S. J. Burton, “Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform in Good Faith”, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369, 369‐71  at 390‐
391(1980); A.D. Miller and R. Perry, “Good Faith Performance”, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 689 at 707 (2013) 
162 Z. X. Tan, “Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐Yam Seng and Bhasin” (2016) J.B.L.420 at 428‐429 
163 See also A. D. Miller and R. Perry, “Good Faith Performance”, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 689 at 706 (2013) 
164See decisions in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 and Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50. 
165 [2017] UKSC 24 
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as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality 
of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements 
of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective 
meaning.166 
Following recent precedents, the courts are likely to interpret the 
confines of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation 
narrowly, bearing mind the language chosen by the parties and the 
contractual context of the duty.  
Conclusion  
The mutual trust and co-operation obligation under both NEC3 and 
NEC4 are at the heart of the cultural change agenda of the NEC 
Conditions. These obligations are critical to the smooth operation of 
the contract forms, particularly the aspects dealing with project 
management measures. The duty has been widely viewed as 
connoting good faith. Certainly, there is evidence of good faith 
overtones in the clause 10 duty. However, the question still remains 
as to whether the concepts used in couching the duty are merely 
substitutes for good faith. English practice supports using disparate 
concepts (instead of ‘good faith’) to achieve what continental users 
of good faith would intend it to achieve. Bearing in mind that the NEC 
forms have distinctly English origins, what then do the concepts 
‘mutual trust’ and ‘co-operation’ entail? Similar concepts in 
employment and planning law have distinct and developed meanings 
in English law. The concepts in the context of the NEC Conditions may 
have a more confined implication than the broader good faith 
concept. 
Three key observations are discernible from the examination of cases 
which have specifically dealt with or commented on the NEC3 ECC 
Clause 10 or NEC4 ECC Clause 10.2 duty. Firstly, the courts have yet 
to engage in a detailed analysis of the clause 10 duty. The English 
courts have made no attempt to examine the meaning of the words 
used by the contractual parties namely, ‘mutual trust’ and ‘co-
operation’, even though there is sufficient legal precedents on each 
concept to aid such exercise. Secondly, the English courts have also 
not provided detailed analysis on behaviours or conducts which may 
or may not constitute a breach of the duty to act in a spirit of mutual 
trust and co-operation. Thirdly, the courts have given no indications 
regarding consequence of breach of the clause 10 duty and possible 
remedies. A review of the English courts’ attitude to express good 
faith clauses has shown that they prefer to interpret such clauses 
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narrowly, not as overarching principles. Such clauses are subject to 
the same rules of contract interpretation as any other contract term. 
On the issue of the interpretation of the duty to act in a spirit of 
mutual trust and co-operation, it is fair to say that the courts’ position 
on the subject is still developing. Given the English approach to 
addressing good faith related issues, it is plausible to expect that soon 
the courts may move away from simply substituting good faith for 
the duty to act in a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation and begin 
to pay attention to the words/concepts in the clause itself. Before 
then, users of NEC3 and NEC4 concerned with how breach of this 
duty is determined and the likely remedy can rely on the plain 
provisions of the forms. The NEC Conditions provide clear procedure 
on how anticipated or actual breach of the clause 10 duty should be 
handled. The Conditions also provide clear guidance on remedies for 
breach of the duty; these are limited to price adjustment and 
extension of time under the contract. Damages are expressly ruled 
out as a contractual remedy.  
 
 
